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Abstract 
Lone-actor terrorist attacks are on the rise in the Western world in 
terms of numbers and severity. Public officials are eager for an evidence-
based tool to assess the risk that individuals pose for terroristic 
involvement. Yet actuarial models of risk validated for ordinary criminal 
violence are unsuitable to terrorism. Lone-actor terrorists vary 
dramatically in their socio-psychological profiles and the base rate of 
terrorism is too low for actuarial modeling to achieve statistical 
significance. This Article proposes a new conceptual model for the 
terroristic threat assessment of individuals. Unlike risk assessment that is 
founded upon numerical probabilities, this threat assessment considers 
possibilistic thinking and considers the often idiosyncratic ideologies and 
strategies of lone-actor terrorists. 
The conceptual threat assessment model connects three overlapping 
foundations: (a) structured professional judgment concerning an 
individual’s goals, capabilities, and susceptibility to extremist thought, 
plus the imminence of a potential terroristic attack; (b) a multidisciplinary 
intelligence team engaging collective imaginaries of an otherwise 
unknown future of terrorism events; and (c) coordination between 
counterintelligence officials and academic communities to share data and 
conduct more research on lone-actor terrorists utilizing a systematic case 
study approach and engaging theoretical methodologies to inform about 
potential new ideological motivations and terroristic strategies which 
may be emerging due to cultural, environmental, and political drivers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
News headlines, policy center papers, and academic literature have 
been expounding upon the benefits generated by the government’s use of 
big data to predict the future risk posed by individuals.1 Proponents claim 
that risk assessment tools developed on large datasets offer a transparent, 
consistent, and logical method of differentiating high risk offenders from 
low risk offenders and managing them accordingly.2 But one area of 
crime where big data provides virtually no assistance is risk assessment 
of the so-called lone actor terrorists.  
For the purposes of this Article, terrorism is defined as the unlawful 
use of violence to instill fear or to intimidate in furtherance of an 
ideological goal.3 Here, lone-actor terrorists refers to those acting outside 
of a group’s direct influence.  
                                                                                                                     
 1. E.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 327, 394 (2015); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016, 
1:45 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/YT92-8TJ3]; Crysta Jentile & Michelle Lawrence, How Government 
Use of Big Data can Harm Communities, FORD FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/how-government-use-of-big-
data-can-harm-communities/ [https://perma.cc/TJM7-GCME]; Sony Kassam, Legality of Using 
Predictive Data to Determine Sentences Challenged in Wisconsin Supreme Court Case, A.B.A J. 
(June 27, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legality_of_using_ 
predictive_data_to_determine_sentences_challenged_in_wisc [https://perma.cc/3K5D-AKHF]. 
 2. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk 
Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 725 
(2011). 
 3. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2017). 
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Terrorism is unlike any other crime in that terrorist attacks on lives, 
property, and infrastructure have consequences of unparalleled 
magnitude. As a result, terrorism takes an extraordinary toll on civil 
societies through the heightened level of fear it generates.4 Countries 
have responded to a recent uptake in terroristic violence by enhancing 
their abilities to detect and capture terrorists or would-be terrorists. This 
has resulted in an increase in the number of terrorists processed through 
criminal justice systems.5 Hence, officials press for tools that will permit 
more accurate assessments to predict which individuals are likely to 
engage in future acts of terrorism. Assessments would be useful across 
criminal justice decisions, including pretrial detention,6 security 
classification,7 sentencing, parole release, supervision conditions upon 
release,8 and reintegration plans.9 Government agencies and private 
employers may wish to assess potential employees to the extent that 
greater consequences may result when terroristic attacks are orchestrated 
from inside.10 Risk assessment protocols are therefore of interest to many 
constituencies, primarily to law enforcement, national security, 
correctional institutions, and other governmental and private agencies.11 
Despite the call for a terrorist risk assessment tool, the contemporary 
model of risk assessment in the criminal justice system is unhelpful. One 
reason behind this is that the relatively small number of terrorist attackers 
challenge the statistical strength of any potential model. This also means 
that the same array of “big data” that typically informs risk models simply 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. Hannah Fairfield & Tim Wallace, The Terrorists in U.S. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/07/us/terrorists-in-us-prisons.html 
[https://perma.cc/LS6Z-PA37]; Bethany Minelle, Record Number of Terror-Related Arrests, SKY 
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/record-number-of-terror-related-
arrests-11034789 [https://perma.cc/LB2Q-SMTZ]. 
 6. John Monahan, The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism: Recent Developments, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF THE CRIMINOLOGY OF TERRORISM 520, 521 (Gary LaFree & Joshua D. Freilich 
eds., 2017). 
 7. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENT 
EXTREMIST PRISONERS AND THE PREVENTION OF RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENCE IN PRISONS 61 
(2016), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XDD6-Q8GQ]. 
 8. Monica Lloyd & Christopher Dean, The Development of Structured Guidelines for 
Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 40, 49 (2015), 
http://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2015-56730-005.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQD2-S25W]. 
 9. TINKA M. VELDHUIS, REINTEGRATING VIOLENT EXTREMIST OFFENDERS: POLICY 
QUESTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 7 (2015), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/ 
downloads/VeldhuisPaper-Final%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/7YUQ-DKJ8]. 
 10. David BaMaung et al., The Enemy Within? The Connection Between Insider Threat and 
Terrorism, 41 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 133, 134 (2018).  
 11. D. Elaine Pressman & John Flockton, Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists 
and Terrorists: The VERA 2 Structured Assessment, 14 BRIT. J. FORENSIC PRAC. 237, 238 (2012). 
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does not exist with respect to terrorism. Plus, empirical research on 
terrorists is a relatively nascent academic field, though more studies are 
materializing as of late, albeit of varying degrees of quality and scientific 
rigor.12 
Nonetheless, this situation does not mean that science-informed 
practices for the detection and management of terrorists are impossible. 
Indeed, counterterrorism work should inherently be an evidence-based 
activity.13 The framework and the modeling must simply be reassessed. 
The use of the word “simply” here is for colloquial purposes, as the 
reformulation of a framework for terrorists requires significant efforts, 
innovative methods, and novel theoretical approaches on the parts of 
multiple government agencies and disciplinary fields. This Article offers 
an integrated platform as a foundation for assessments of the future 
dangerousness of individual terrorists. The significance of this Article is 
to integrate discrete elements into a broader, more concrete framework; 
to articulate how the parts relate to each other; to encourage professionals 
with different counterterrorism-related roles to identify and better 
understand each other and their skillsets; and to emphasize the 
importance of drawing on theoretical and empirical knowledge from 
academic research.  
Part I of this Article highlights emerging issues with lone-actor 
terrorists and why they specifically deserve analytical focus apart from 
group-based extremists. Part II briefly reviews the landscape of risk 
assessment practices in the criminal justice context and explains why risk 
assessment tools designed to address ordinary criminal violence are 
unsuitable for evaluating terrorists.  
Part III then offers a fresh conceptual framework for assessing 
individuals’ potential to carry out lone-actor terroristic attacks. The 
framework conceptualizes overlapping agendas. The first agenda depicts 
a forensic analysis that forms a threat assessment model. Threat replaces 
the notion of risk. Unlike risk assessment, threat assessment does not 
operate as a mathematical tool that computes probability estimates. 
Instead, the concept of threat assessment accepts that for terrorists, 
quantitative judgements are unfeasible, and that the goal is prevention 
over predictive precision. In this threat assessment model, the evaluator 
focuses on intention, capability, vulnerability to radicalization, and 
potential consequences of an attack.  
The second agenda bolsters security intelligence with a 
multidisciplinary team of behavioural scientists, forensic evaluators, 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See J. Reid Meloy & Jacqueline Genzman, The Clinical Threat Assessment of the Lone-
Actor Terrorist, 39 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 649, 650 (2016). 
 13. José María Blanco & Jéssica Cohen, Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy: 
Evaluating the ‘Big Picture,’ 13 EUR. POLICE SCI. & RES. BULL. 26, 26 (2015), https://www.cepol. 
europa.eu/sites/default/files/science-research-bulletin-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J7G-3FBJ]. 
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intelligence analysts, and law enforcement personnel. Counterterrorism 
evaluations of individuals as potential terrorists cannot rely upon standard 
investigatory techniques. The unpredictability of terrorists requires a 
human imagination, even collective imaginaries, to conjure a 
hypothetical future in which a determined ideologue may launch an 
extremist attack. 
Scientifically-led research forms the third agenda. The focus sketches 
a systematic case study of terrorists, their pathways to extremism, and 
their trajectories toward carrying out extremist violence. As this 
information is often sequestered by governments for security purposes, 
requisite confidentiality agreements should be negotiated so that 
counterterrorism agencies can provide researchers with sufficient data to 
analyze. In addition, intelligence officials should call for more 
dynamically-oriented research to inform about potential new forms of 
extremist ideologies, lone actor strategies, and modes of attack. 
I.  LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM 
Terrorism is not new.14 Now, though, it is of paramount political and 
security concern in Western countries.15 The contemporary threat of 
terror has quantitatively and qualitatively metamorphosed. 
Quantitatively, the threat of terrorism in the West has increased 
exponentially.16 The Global Terrorism Index of 2017 confirms that the 
spread of terrorism has expanded over the last decade in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.17 Many of 
the latest terrorist attacks are of higher magnitude.18 From a qualitative 
perspective, terrorism is taking an exorbitant toll on feelings of peace and 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Anthony Fainberg, Terrorist Threats: Technical and Policy Approaches to Countering 
Them, 1898 AIP CONF. PROC. 050003, 050003-3 (2017), http://aip.scitation.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1063/1.5009232 [https://perma.cc/K7QX-L8RV]. 
 15. Gabe Mythen, Thinking with Ulrich Beck: Security, Terrorism, and Transformation, 21 
J. RISK RES. 17, 19 (2017); Yael Litmanovitz et al., What are the Social, Economic, Psychological 
and Environmental Risk Factors that Lead to Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism?: 
A Systematic Review, CAMPBELL COLLABORATION 1 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.campbell 
collaboration.org/library/download/1003_78895d4f2e0a8caa3046941fc65c9117.html  
[https://perma.cc/KEH2-ZQLJ] (opining that terrorism is “[p]erhaps one of the most pressing 
issues facing the world today”).  
 16. Litmanovitz et al., supra note 15. 
 17. INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2017: MEASURING AND 
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM 53 (2017), http://visionofhumanity.org/app/ 
uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8HH-MENX]. 
 18. Id. at 54 (reporting a notable increase in the number of attacks and deaths by terrorists 
in OECD countries since 2014); Mythen, supra note 15, at 20. 
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security for citizens and communities.19 Terroristic attacks, and the threat 
of them, have altered social values, changed individual and collective 
behaviors, and degraded confidence in governments.20  
Violent extremism has disproportionately impacted societal stability 
and has driven significant changes in Western nations’ domestic and 
foreign policies.21 For instance, countries anguished by terroristic threats 
have tended, in the last two decades, to react by bolstering and focusing 
homeland and foreign security forces on such threats, even though these 
actions strain financial, personnel, and institutional resources.22 The ill 
effects of these diversions are then felt across health, social, political, and 
economic institutions and structures.23  
A.  Escalation of Lone-Actor Terrorism 
As of late, some of the more significant terrorist groups in the Western 
world, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for 
instance, have lost much of their power, wealth, and resources such that 
there are signs of their decline.24 Yet terrorism remains a priority: The 
spectre of lone-actor attacks is alarming security officials across the 
West.25 A variety of definitions of lone-actor terrorism abound across the 
literature. We need not parse them here. For the purposes of this article, 
lone-actor terrorists are reasonably defined as those that operate chiefly 
outside of organizational structures, without institutional support and 
resources, and independent of larger group dynamics.26  
                                                                                                                     
 19. Wael Haddara, A Policy-Oriented Framework for Understanding Violent Extremism, 
29 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 1 (Mar. 20, 2017), https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol29/iss1/4/ 
[https://perma.cc/RC2J-GZQX]. 
 20. Blanco & Cohen, supra note 13, at 31. 
 21. Haddara, supra note 19. 
 22. Orlandrew E. Danzell & Lisandra M. Maisonet Montañez, Understanding the Lone 
Wolf Terror Phenomena: Assessing Current Profiles, 8 BEHAV. SCI. TERRORISM & POL. 
AGGRESSION 135, 136 (2016); Janice Gross Stein & Ron Levi, The Social Psychology of Denial: 
Deterring Terrorism, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 409, 411 (2015). 
 23. Litmanovitz et al., supra note 15. 
 24. See Daniel Byman, Explaining Al Qaeda’s Decline, 79 J. POL. 1106, 1107 (2017); Syed 
Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff & Remy Mahzam, Islamic State after the Fall of Mosul and Raqqa: 
Impact on Organisation and Propaganda, 10 COUNTER TERRORIST TRENDS & ANALYSES 57, 57 
(2018).  
 25. Monahan, Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 527; Michele T. Pathé et al., 
Establishing a Joint Agency Response to the Threat of Lone-Actor Grievance-Fueled Violence, 
29 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 37, 39 (2018).  
 26. KATHLEEN DELOUGHERY ET AL., NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & 
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, UNDERSTANDING LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS WITH VIOLENT HATE CRIMES AND GROUP-BASED TERRORISM, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
RESILIENT SYSTEMS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2013), 
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The growing number and magnitude of attacks by lone-actor extremists 
is an important reason for the fresh apprehension amongst security 
forces.27 Lone-actor terrorist attacks have been acutely consequential in 
recent years in the United States and certain European countries, such as 
the United Kingdom and Germany.28 And lone-actor terrorism creates 
certain ancillary costs.29 Lone-actor attacks often come without warning 
and appear random; they are coined “pop-up terror” as a result.30 
Consequently, civilians may feel more vulnerable and less able to defend 
themselves from lone actors.31 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_IUSSD_U
nderstandingLoneactorTerrorism_Sept2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ5J-VJU2]. 
The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting 
out of purely personal material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider 
audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation 
and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any 
group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others).  
Wes Mountain & Raffaello Pantucci, Comic Explainer: What is Lone-Actor Terrorism?, THE 
CONVERSATION (Nov. 28, 2017, 2:09 PM), http://theconversation.com/comic-explainer-what-is-
lone-actor-terrorism-86774 [https://perma.cc/W3UW-7G7R]. 
While some might describe lone-actor terrorists as those acting entirely independently, 
perhaps a better vision understands lone-actors as not exclusively insular in their ideologies, 
preparations, and access to instrumentalities of attack. Instead, many lone terrorists at some point 
receive indirect assistance from others, wittingly or not, in their preparations. See Danzell & 
Montañez, supra note 22, at 139. “[I]t is not always clear that lone actors are truly alone, and 
usually investigation uncovers contacts, leakage and evidence of connection with others that casts 
doubt on the degree of isolation that can be attributed to an individual.” Raffaello Pantucci et al., 
Royal United Servs. Inst. for Def. & Sec. Studies, Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review, 
COUNTERING LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM: LIT. REV. 2015, 1, 1 (Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism 
Ser. No. 1, 2015), https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TAE-2NKD]. There is evidence across countries that at least some lone-actor 
attacks may actually be known terrorist groups’ tactical response to governmental security forces 
foiling group-based or network-connected terrorist activities with increasing effectiveness. Id. at 
3. Thus, terrorist groups appear to be setting up individuals to act without the group’s formal 
institutional support, but in furtherance of terrorist group ideologies and aimed at their preferred 
targets. Id. This type of scheme now appears to be easily facilitated by the internet and social 
media outlets and targeted at individuals interested in self-radicalizing. Id. The point, though, is 
that lone actors act relatively autonomously regarding extremist infrastructures. 
 27. See EUROPOL, CHANGES IN MODUS OPERANDI OF ISLAMIC STATE (IS) REVISITED § 3 
(2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-
islamic-state-revisited [https://perma.cc/WW8G-TU74]. The Global Terrorism Index of 2017 
confirms that lone-actor terrorism increased over the last ten years in Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, supra note 17, at 69. 
 28. Danzell & Montañez, supra note 22, at 135–36. 
 29. Id. at 136. 
 30. Roy Williams, Fractured Narratives and Pop-Up Diaspora: Re-Theorizing the 
Capillaries of Power, Terror and Intimacy, 8 DYNAMICS ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 134, 135 (2015). 
 31. Haddara, supra note 19. 
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The European Commission on Terrorism, in reporting a rise in the 
number of lone-actor terrorists since 2008, notes that these lone actors 
draw on a greater variety of ideologies and appear more unconstrained 
than traditional terrorist groups.32 Moreover, the European Union warns 
that lone actors who are European citizens cause further damage by 
creating social divisions between European communities, instigating a 
ripple effect of more extremism in other parts of civil society as a result.33 
The spike in lone-actor terrorists is due in part to the increasing ability 
to self-radicalize via extremist materials on the internet and digital 
technology communications.34 This suggests that lone actors are not 
entirely detached from social forces, but that they distinguish themselves 
from group-based terrorists in eschewing face-to-face contact in favor of 
interactions that can be anonymously plied behind computer or cell phone 
screens. 
B.  Preventing Lone-Actor Attacks 
The heightened concern regarding lone-actor terrorist attacks is 
justified for additional reasons. The European Counter Terrorism Centre 
recently conceded that lone actors are more difficult to thwart, in large 
part due to their lack of organizational ties.35 A research report submitted 
to the United States Department of Homeland Security references the lack 
of usual avenues for detection used by counterterrorism agents.36 
Regarding “a lone actor[,] there is no hierarchical organization to disrupt, 
no large network to infiltrate, no group literature to monitor, and few 
public statements to interpret or background chatter to analyze for 
patterns.”37 Lone actors enjoy greater freedom in their activities by being 
unrestrained by actions or words which may alienate supporters or trigger 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on Preventing 
Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response, at 2, COM 
(2013) 941 Final 10 (Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Preventing Radicalisation], 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/crisis-and-
terrorism/radicalisation/docs/communication_on_preventing_radicalisation_and_violence_prom
oting_extremism_201301_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2DT-U3LN]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Matthew Feldman, Comparative Lone Wolf Terrorism: Toward a Heuristic Definition, 
9 DEMOCRACY & SECURITY 270, 270, 274, 280 (2013). 
 35. EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CTR., EUROPOL, LONE ACTOR ATTACKS—RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/ 
lone_actor_attacks_-_recent_developments_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2W4-8X9H]. 
 36. DELOUGHERY ET AL., supra note 26, at 2. 
 37. Id. 
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governmental crackdowns on a group.38 Also, lone-actor extremists need 
not seek advance approval from a collective or its leaders.39 The “solitary 
nature of lone wolf terrorism is its most pernicious aspect” in frustrating 
early identification.40 This may explain one study’s finding that 
counterterrorism forces in the United States took longer to detect lone-
actor terrorists than group-based terrorists.41 Nonetheless, social isolation 
does not render lone actors as one-off threats, especially considering that 
lone actor “successes” appear to attract copycats.42 
Failure to affiliate with an organization allows lone actors to be more 
idiosyncratic in their ideological drivers.43 Lone actors often show great 
innovation in tactical strategies:44 Not requiring the approval of others 
may offer lone actors the freedom to think outside the box.45 Yet lone-
actor terrorists are not necessarily more sophisticated than group actors. 
Lone actors favor using attack tools that are readily obtained or created, 
or that are modified to become instrumentalities of mass death, such as 
high-powered firearms, improvised explosive devices,46 and, lately, 
vehicles to plow into crowds.47 Lone actors purportedly view their own 
actions as constituting “asymmetrical, propagandistic warfare.”48 
In sum, the idiosyncratic nature, the seemingly haphazard choice of 
targets, and the unpredictability of lone-actor bogeymen differentiate this 
type of terrorist.49 These realities only increase the appetite of security 
and criminal justice officials for a risk assessment tool that can offer a 
systematic and unbiased ability to differentiate individuals who are at 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat, in LONE 
ACTORS—AN EMERGING SECURITY THREAT 3, 4 (Aaron Richman & Yair Sharan eds., 2015).  
 39. Pantucci et al., supra note 26, at 14. 
 40. DELOUGHERY ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (citing Peter J. Phillips, Lone Wolf Terrorism, 
1 PEACE ECON. PEACE SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2011)). 
 41. Brent L. Smith et al., The Emergence of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Patterns of Behavior and 
Implications for Intervention, 20 SOC. CRIME L. & DEVIANCE 91, 107 tbl.7 (2015). 
 42. PAUL GILL, LONE-ACTOR TERRORISTS: A BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS 9 (2015). 
 43. Paul Gill, Bringing Terrorists into Sharper Focus, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2015, 
5:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/paul-gill-bringing-terrorists-sharper-focus-
article-1.2081837 [https://perma.cc/HYK9-FX5T]. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Pantucci et al., supra note 26, at 1, 14. 
 46. Gabriel Koehler-Derrick & Daniel James Milton, Choose Your Weapon: The Impact of 
Strategic Considerations and Resource Constraints on Terrorist Group Weapon Selection, 
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 4–5, 6 (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 
10.1080/09546553.2017.1293533. 
 47. See János Besenyö, Low-Cost Attacks, Unnoticeable Plots? Overview on the 
Economical Character of Current Terrorism, 62 STRATEGIC IMPACT 83, 84, 93 (2017). 
 48. Feldman, supra note 34, at 282. 
 49. See Daniel Peddell et al., Influences and Vulnerabilities in Radicalised Lone-Actor 
Terrorists: UK Practitioner Perspectives, 18 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 63, 65 (2016). 
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higher risk of extremist violence and manage that risk to prevent 
attacks.50 
It is important to note that despite not enjoying the potential 
advantages of an existing infrastructure and the resources of organized 
terrorist groups, lone actors are not necessarily less dangerous. To 
illustrate, a recent study comparing terrorism cases found that, at least in 
the United States, lone-actor terrorists were more lethal than group-based 
attackers.51 That study’s author suggests that the strength of 
counterterrorism infrastructures in the United States may inhibit the 
success of group attacks.52 At the same time, lone actors may find solace 
in the “country’s history of Right-Wing lone wolf activity, high gun 
ownership, and relatively violent culture.”53 Concerning this last 
reflection on a violent culture, one may question why statistically-
modelled risk assessment tools for violence, available and used across 
criminal justice decision points, are not equally applicable to terroristic 
violence. This query is considered next. 
II.  VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 
The evidence-oriented model for risk assessment utilizes findings 
from scientific studies to identify and classify individuals based on the 
risk that they will reoffend.54 Evidence-based models for criminal justice 
practices are popular—even considered best practices—for predicting an 
individual’s likelihood of future dangerousness.55 Informed also by 
theoretical approaches, evidence-based practices offer a welcome 
displacement of raw human presumptions about an individual’s risk of 
criminal offending.56  
More specifically, actuarial risk assessment tools are a prominent 
fixture in the evidence-based practices movement.57 The “risk” in risk 
assessment is meant as a predictive measure for the potential future 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See Jytte Klausen et al., Toward a Behavioral Model of “Homegrown” Radicalization 
Trajectories, 39 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 67, 67 (2015) (“The rapid rise in domestic violent 
extremism has created an urgent need for metrics that can help law enforcement assess the danger 
represented by radicalizing individuals.”). 
 51. Brian J. Phillips, Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves, Terrorist Groups, and Attack 
Lethality, 29 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 533, 545 (2017). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Faye S. Taxman, The Partially Clothed Emperor: Evidence-Based Practices, 34 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 97, 97–98 (2018). 
 55. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61–62 (2017). 
 56. See Alfred Blumstein, Some Perspectives on Quantitative Criminology Pre-JQC: and 
Then Some, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 549, 554 (2010). 
 57. See Eaglin, supra note 55, at 79. 
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outcome of interest.58 In criminal justice, the relevant outcome is 
typically related to recidivism; for violent offenders, the goal is often to 
predict the likelihood of violent reoffending.59 
A.  Risk Assessment Models 
Two classes of risk assessment models are of interest here. The first 
is intrinsically quantitative in nature.60 Actuarial risk methodologies 
derive statistical data from the systematic study of historical group 
samples.61 The general idea of actuarial risk leads scientific researchers 
to run models in order to identify factors which correlate with the future 
event at issue.62 Then researchers choose appropriate correlative factors 
and assign appropriate weights as some factors achieve greater predictive 
ability than others.63 This type of modeling presents as “risk factorology” 
in providing a basis for officials to differentiate between individuals at a 
higher risk of future dangerousness and those posing a lower risk than 
others.64 For criminal justice officials, the risk assessment framework 
generally promotes a “future-oriented logic of risk,”65 and embraces a 
philosophy of risk aversion.66  
Risk assessment tools contain static or dynamic factors, or, more 
suitably, a combination thereof. Static risk factors normally are historical, 
unchangeable, and generally not amenable to interventions.67 Dynamic 
factors reflect criminogenic needs that are mutable in nature and thus 
appropriate targets for reducing risk through appropriate interventions.68  
                                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at 75. 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical Risk Assessment: Old 
Problems and New Applications, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 178, 182 (2006). 
 60. See id. at 180. 
 61. See id. at 181. 
 62. See Chelsea Barabas et al., Interventions over Predictions: Reframing the Ethical 
Debate for Actuarial Risk Assessment, PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. (forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091849 [https://perma.cc/YBK3-XTZR]. 
 63. See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY 
OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 142 (2001). 
 64. See Hazel Kemshall, Crime and Risk, in RISK IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 76, 81–82 (Peter 
Taylor-Gooby & Jens O. Zinn eds., 2006). 
 65. See Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledges of Risk, in LAW AND RISK 86, 116 (Law 
Comm’n of Canada ed., 2005). 
 66. See Min Yang et al., The Efficacy of Violence Prediction: A Meta-Analytic Comparison 
of Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 740, 740 (2010). 
 67. Tracy L. Fass et al., The LSI-R and the COMPAS: Validation Data on Two Risk-Needs 
Tools, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1095, 1096 (2008). 
 68. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: 
What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (1996). 
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The most popular actuarial risk tool for violence is the Violence Risk 
Appraisal Guide (VRAG).69 The VRAG provides a weighted point 
scoring system on each of twelve static factors, including criminal 
history, age, marital status, history of alcohol problems, and presence of 
a personality disorder.70 The assessor scores each factor and then derives 
a final sum. The higher the resulting sum, the greater the predicted 
likelihood of violent recidivism. For example, the assessor may conclude 
that based on the individual’s total score of six, the VRAG would judge 
the individual’s likelihood of violent reoffending at forty-four percent.71 
An alternative to a pure actuarial model is the structured professional 
judgement (SPJ) model consisting of “an analytical method used to 
understand and mitigate the risk for interpersonal violence posed by 
individual people that is discretionary in essence but relies on evidence-
based guidelines to systematize the exercise of discretion.”72 An SPJ-
based instrument incorporates an actuarial-led factorology, yet also 
provides latitude for the evaluator to consider any idiosyncratic factors 
that, in her clinical judgement, are risk-relevant to the individual 
assessed.73  
An example of an SPJ tool may be of interest. A well-known SPJ tool 
for violence risk assessment and management is the HCR-20, so named 
for the twenty risk factors in the domains of Historical, Clinical, and Risk 
Scales.74 The Historical Scale items generally include past antisocial or 
violent behavior, the presence of mental or personality disorder, and 
certain sociodemographic characteristics.75 The Clinical Scale is meant 
to score dynamic factors and includes such items as insight, violent 
ideation, signs of instability, and treatment response.76 The Risk 
Management scale is also dynamic, though more future-oriented in 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 
20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011). 
 70. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 
147 (1998). 
 71. This type of judgement is not empirically accurate as these tools provide group-based 
statistics, not individualized predictions. However, it is common practice among forensic 
evaluators to conflate the two. See Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and 
Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 44 (2015). 
 72. Stephen D. Hart et al., The Structured Professional Judgment Approach to Violence 
Risk Assessment: Origins, Nature, and Advances, in II THE WILEY HANDBOOK ON THE THEORIES, 
ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDING 643, 643 (Leam A. Craig & Martin 
Rettenberger eds., 2016).  
 73. Anthony Costa Constantinou et al., Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Violent 
Reoffending Among Prisoners, 42 EXPERT SYS. APPLICATIONS 7511, 7512 (2015). 
 74. Kevin S. Douglas et al., Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-
20V3): Development and Overview, 13 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 93, 98 tbl.1 (2014). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 
2018] A THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR LONE-ACTOR TERRORISTS 1331 
 
assessing such things as potential problems with professional services, 
living situation, treatment responsiveness, and coping skills.77 HCR-20 
requires an ordinal ranking as to each factor in terms of being not present, 
possibly or partially present, or present.78 The clinical evaluator is then 
given the freedom to consider any additional matter that, in her clinical 
analysis, appears relevant to the individual’s risk for violent recidivism.79 
In the end, the assessor considers the various ratings across factors and 
renders a discretionary judgement as to whether the individual presents a 
low, moderate, or high risk of violence.80 
Dozens of actuarial tools and SPJ tools for violence risk assessment 
are available and in use by various agencies throughout the world,81 with 
VRAG and HCR-20 mentioned for illustration purposes. However, for 
various real-world and empirical reasons, none of these pre-existing 
instruments for assessing violent reoffending are appropriate to assess a 
population consisting of terrorists or would-be terrorists.  
B.  Terrorists as Anomalies 
At the outset, it is important to recognize significant distinctions 
between ordinary criminal violence—for which various actuarial-based 
risk tools (such as VRAG and HCR-20) have shown a generally 
acceptable level of predictive validity on certain populations—and 
terroristic violence, for which no tool has established sufficient predictive 
ability.82 The contention herein is that terrorist attacks do not constitute 
ordinary criminal violence. Terrorists are anomalies. The contrasts that 
will be cited are, notably, relevant to risk. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 77. Id. 
 78. Diane S. Strub et al., The Validity of Version 3 of the HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment 
Scheme Amongst Offenders and Civil Psychiatric Patients, 13 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 
148, 150 (2014). HCR-20 is currently at version 3. Versions 1 and 2 of HCR-20 had assigned 0, 
1, or 2 points to each of the twenty items, with higher totals indicating greater risk. Id. Guidance 
is provided for rating the presence of each factor in order to provide some structure. Id. The 
instrument instructs assessors to additionally consider the relevance of each of the twenty factors 
in terms of being of low relevance to violence, moderately relevant, or highly relevant to the 
individual assessed. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Thomas Douglas et al., Risk Assessment Tools in Criminal Justice and Forensic 
Psychiatry: The Need for Better Data, 42 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 134, 134 (2017). 
 82. Jay P. Singh et al., A Comparative Study of Violence Risk Assessment Tools: A 
Systematic Review and Metaregression Analysis of 68 Studies Involving 25,980 Participants, 31 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 499, 509–10 (2011). 
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1.  Drivers to Violence 
Ordinary criminal violence is typically affective violence in that it is 
reactive, defensive, emotional, and/or impulsive; terroristic attacks are 
predatory in nature, begetting proactive, instrumental, and targeted acts 
of violence.83 Ordinary criminal violence tends to be more temporally 
discrete in its reactionary style and situationally limited; terroristic 
violence typically requires forethought and planning, and is aimed at 
long-term impact projected at a wider audience.84  
Unlike ordinary criminals, terrorists often believe their violence is 
altruistic in the sense of achieving ideologically-driven ends for a higher 
moral cause.85 Conventional criminal sanctions are therefore less likely 
to deter terrorists.86 Thus, while individuals who commit ordinary 
violence generally attempt to avoid detection, terrorists are attention-
grabbers seeking high-impact consequences from their attacks, which 
requires that their actions be shocking and gain public recognition, and 
also that the underlying causes be comprehended.87 For these various 
reasons, the drivers and motivations behind ordinary violence and 
terrorism differ in risk relevant ways that are simply not captured in the 
preexisting risk tools for ordinary criminal violence.88  
2.  Pathways to Terrorism 
Certain correlates of terrorism are largely inapplicable to ordinary 
criminal violence. Terrorists’ high-impact goals require intangible and 
tangible resources that go far beyond motive and intent. Terrorists 
typically must navigate two long-term processes, albeit presenting some 
overlap, to advance to the stage of executing a terrorist attack. The first 
                                                                                                                     
 83. J. Reid Meloy, Threat Assessment: Scholars, Operators, Our Past, Our Future, 2 J. 
THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 231, 232 (2015). 
 84. Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12, at 649. 
 85. See generally Rick O’Gorman & Andrew Silke, Terrorism as Altruism: An 
Evolutionary Model for Understanding Terrorist Psychology, in EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
AND TERRORISM 149 (Max Taylor et al. eds., 2015) (discussing the psychology of terrorism and 
especially focusing on altruism). 
 86. Jennifer Varriale Carson & Brad Bartholomew, Terrorism Outside the Proverbial 
Vacuum: Implications for the Moral Context, 37 DEVIANT BEHAV. 557, 557 (2016); see also 
Robert A. Fein et al., Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence, NAT’L INST. 
JUST.: RES. ACTION, July 1995, at 1, 2, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/threat.pdf (“The threat of 
sanctions, such as a long prison sentence, may not deter a person who desperately desires revenge 
or is prepared to die to achieve his objective.”). 
 87. John Monahan, The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism, 18 PSYCHOL. PUBLIC 
POL’Y & L. 167, 175 (2011). 
 88. Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 241. 
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is a radicalization process for extremist thought.89 The radicalization 
process is nonlinear, often involving some combination of push and pull 
factors which either draw the individual toward an extremist mindset or 
are disinhibiting.90 Research shows that circumstances such as social 
isolation, a perception of discrimination, a search for identity, or feelings 
of injustice in the world may push an individual toward radicalization.91 
Examples of common factors that pull a person into radicalization include 
the consumption of extremist material, family or friends who are 
members of an extremist group, and desire for status and adventure.92  
Push and pull factors go the other direction, too, by disinhibiting the 
actual adoption of an extremist mindset or deradicalization after 
embracing radical ideologies.93 These are considered protective factors 
that reduce the potential of extremist thought.94 Some push factors which 
may precipitate disengagement include disillusionment, lost faith in the 
ideology, or burnout.95 Protective pull factors, such as desire for an 
intimate relationship, a traditional family, or conventional employment, 
draw people toward a more mainstream and prosocial life.96 Hence, 
consideration of both risk factors and protective factors that 
disincentivize radicalization to an extremist ideology is substantively 
essential for terrorism assessments.97   
Part of the radicalization trajectory toward endorsing extremist actions 
entails developing a mindset in which terroristic activities and the killing 
of “innocents” is acceptable and even exalted.98 This often involves 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See generally Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, Understanding Political 
Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model, 72 AM. PSYCHOL. 205, 206 (2017) (discussing 
radicalization to extremist opinion and describing an initial step as a “cognitive opening” that 
could make one susceptible to new, extremist thoughts and ideals). 
 90. Randy Borum, Assessing Risk for Terrorism Involvement, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & 
MGMT. 63, 68 (2015). 
 91. Stijn Sieckelinck et al., Transitional Journeys Into and Out of Extremism: A 
Biographical Approach, STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 2 (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1407075. 
 92. See id. 
 93. John Horgan et al., Walking Away: The Disengagement and De-Radicalization of a 
Violent Right-Wing Extremist, 9 BEHAV. SCI. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 63, 63–64 (2017). 
 94. Paul Gill, Toward a Scientific Approach to Identifying and Understanding Indicators 
of Radicalization and Terrorist Intent: Eight Key Problems, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 
187, 188 (2015). 
 95. Horgan et al., supra note 93. 
 96. Id. at 94. 
 97. Borum, supra note 90, at 66. 
 98. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., To the Fringe and Back: Violent Extremism and the 
Psychology of Deviance, 72 AM. PSYCHOL. 217, 222–23 (2017). 
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individuals dehumanizing the “others” they blame for their grievances.99 
Dehumanization is a cognitive ploy to psychologically and morally 
justify using violent methods against beings conceptualized in more 
animalistic terms.100  
In addition to the radicalization process, the long path toward a 
terrorist attack generally requires planning, preparing, and eventually 
executing it.101 A study of lone-actor terrorist attacks found that lone 
actors committed on average two to three precursor acts, the majority of 
which were at least three months preceding the attack; one-third of the 
precursor acts occurred more than a year beforehand.102 Researchers 
explain that successful terrorist attacks demand capability in that 
motivated extremists must attain the opportunity, capacity, and the 
tangible means to carry them out.103 Because of the prerequisite of 
capability, there is often a learning process whereby would-be terrorists 
seek to attain the requisite knowledge and skills in terms of honing their 
approaches, strategies, and identification of vulnerable targets in order to 
improve their chances of success.104  
These dual pathways of radicalization and preparation are rather 
unique to terrorism and thus also distinguish terroristic violence from 
ordinary criminal violence.105 The radicalization process preceding 
violent extremism has no real corollary in other types of violence, which 
more often erupt without any antecedent, grievance, or strategy.106 
Currently available actuarial tools for violence prediction ignore these 
distinctions by failing to address the aforementioned situational and 
capacity-oriented characteristics specific to committing terroristic 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Manuela Caiani, Radical Right-Wing Movements: Who, When, How and Why?, 
SOCIOPEDIA.ISA 8 (Jan. 1, 2017), www.sagepub.net/isa/resources/pdf/RadicalRight 
Movements.pdf. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See generally Lasse Lindekilde et al., Radicalization Patterns and Modes of Attack 
Planning and Preparation Among Lone-Actor Terrorists: An Exploratory Analysis, BEHAV. SCI. 
TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 8 (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ 
full/10.1080/19434472.2017.1407814 (explaining that some of the deadliest lone-acting terrorists 
invested considerable time and effort into preparing for their attacks). 
 102. Smith et al., supra note 41, at 104 tbls.3 & 4. 
 103. Lindekilde et al., supra note 101. 
 104. See generally Louise Kettle & Andrew Mumford, Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical 
Framework, 40 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 523, 534 (2017) (concluding that terrorists are 
attempting to improve their chance of success through learning processes). 
 105. See Eric Shuman et al., Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role 
of Implicit Theories, 37 POL. PSYCHOL. 835, 835–36 (2016) (finding dual pathways to be a unique 
antecedent of collective action, including radical terrorism). 
 106. See Alex S. Wilner & Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, Transformative Radicalization: 
Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization, 34 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 418, 433 
(2011) (explaining that the radicalization process occurs gradually rather than impulsively). 
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violence.107 It is not surprising, then, that one study found that many risk 
predictors of ordinary criminal violence (including major mental illness, 
substance abuse, relationship instability, impulsivity, and lack of insight) 
were not relevant for a sample of terrorists.108 
3.  Terrorism as Low-Likelihood, High-Impact Events 
The next critical issue relates to the duality of frequencies and 
consequences. Fundamentally, in reference to the frequency of outcomes 
observed in a discrete time frame for a specific population, ordinary 
criminal violence and lone-actor terrorism have substantially disparate 
base rates.109 Ordinary criminal violence is commonplace, whereas lone-
actor terroristic violence is a relative rarity.110 Notwithstanding, the scale 
of the severity of the attack for terroristic violence is inordinately higher 
in terms of emotional, economic, and structural consequences to persons, 
communities, and nations.111  
On the whole, acts of ordinary criminal violence are, comparatively, 
high-likelihood, low-impact incidents.112 In stark contrast, terrorist acts 
present as low-likelihood, high-impact events.113  
The low base rate problem leads to an empirical juggernaut with 
respect to crafting a risk assessment tool for individual terrorists. The 
sheer infrequency of terroristic attacks explains the near impossibility of 
crafting a heavily actuarial tool for individual terrorists that can achieve 
the results on predictive validity measures delivered by modern risk 
assessment tools for ordinary violence.114 Validity generally refers to how 
well a tool measures what it is designed to measure. Accordingly, 
predictive validity refers to how well the tool predicts the outcome of 
interest in the real world.115 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Meloy, supra note 83. 
 108. D. ELAINE PRESSMAN, RISK ASSESSMENT DECISIONS FOR VIOLENT POLITICAL 
EXTREMISM 18 tbl.4 (2009). 
 109. MOLLY AMMAN ET AL, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MAKING PREVENTION A 
REALITY: IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING THE THREAT OF TARGETED ATTACKS 
11 (2017), http://nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Making_Prevention_A_Reality.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GD8A-NRVD]. 
 110. Paul Gill et al., Indicators of Lone Actor Violent Events: The Problems of Low Base 
Rates and Long Observational Periods, 3 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 165, 165 (2016). 
 111. Peter Clarke, Investigating Terrorism in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century: 
A Different Sort of Crime, in INVESTIGATING TERRORISM: CURRENT POLITICAL, LEGAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 31, 39 (John Pearse ed., 2015). 
 112. Gill et al., supra note 110. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 187–88. 
 115. Jay P. Singh, Predictive Validity Performance Indicators in Violence Risk Assessment: 
A Methodological Primer, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 8, 8 (2013). 
 
1336 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
Risk assessment focuses on predictive ability as the most important 
measure of validity.116 Yet meeting the gold standard for empirically 
testing predictive validity, a prospective study, is an almost 
insurmountable barrier for terrorism risk assessment.117 While this 
presents as an empirical matter, the reasons for it are simple and practical. 
At least with respect to performing a study to test predictive validity of a 
terrorism recidivism risk instrument, the study would entail (1) scoring 
the particularly terrorist risk tool on a sample of the population of interest 
which includes terrorists and nonterrorists, (2) releasing a large number 
of known terrorists into the community for a long follow-up period, (3) 
observing which of them committed new acts of terrorism, and (4) testing 
how well the tool predicted terroristic recidivism.118 This presents a 
methodological feat for which there is likely little political or public 
support.119 Besides, because of the low base rate, there is unlikely to be a 
sufficiently large, heterogeneous sample of would-be or known terrorists 
to study in the first place.  
Nevertheless, there is a split in risk aversion strategies between the 
scientific and the political. The low base rate for terrorism means that the 
safest actuarially-based estimate, in terms of statistically reducing the 
likelihood of false positives, would be to predict that each individual will 
not commit a terrorist act.120 Yet, such a conservative approach may not 
be considered politically appealing considering the high consequence of 
catastrophic results if the individual is successful in carrying out a 
terroristic attack.121  
In light of the foregoing empirical and practical barriers, John 
Monahan has suggested that empirical methods may yield a bit—a 
postdictive validation on a group of known terrorists might be considered 
minimally sufficient.122 This approach would entail studying the presence 
of the factors tested on known terrorists and a matched group of non-
terrorists and then comparing the results.123 However, such a 
                                                                                                                     
 116. James Bonta, Offender Risk Assessment: Guidelines for Selection and Use, 29 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 355, 358 (2002). 
 117. Mark R. Kebbell & Louise Porter, An Intelligence Assessment Framework for 
Identifying Individuals at Risk of Committing Acts of Violent Extremism Against the West, 25 
SECURITY J. 212, 224–25 (2012) (entailing “norming a test, item analysis and selection, and testing 
validity in an a-priori fashion”). The relevant statistical measures for a prospective analysis are 
positive predictive value and negative predictive value. Singh, supra note 115, at 12. 
 118. Monahan, supra note 87, at 193. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Rick Malone, Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat 
Assessment, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 53, 58 (2015). 
 121. Id. at 58–59. 
 122. Monahan, supra note 6, at 528. 
 123. Monahan, supra note 87, at 194. 
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retrospective inspection on an historical sample is a far less accurate 
measure of performance.124 Still, a select few terrorism researchers have 
crafted potential assessment tools for terrorists along these lines of 
postdictive research methods.  
4.  First Attempts at Terrorism Risk Assessment 
Researchers in the last few years have introduced the Violent 
Extremism Risk Assessment-2 (VERA-2),125 the Extremist Risk 
Guidance (ERG 22+),126 and the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment 
Protocol (TRAP-18)127 as SPJ terrorism risk assessment tools for 
individuals. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze them in great 
detail. But for now, it should suffice to respect these as first attempts at 
systematic assessment approaches, albeit also acknowledging their 
significant limitations. For starters, none of the three tools were 
developed as actuarial models based on statistical analyses. Instead, the 
instruments were theoretically informed by literature reviews, input from 
experts, and selected case histories of convicted terrorists.128 Items 
included therein actually do not constitute risk factors in any event. 
Fundamentally, risk factors require statistical evidence that they are 
correlated to the outcome and precede it in time.129 These developers have 
shown evidence of neither. The factors utilized in their instruments are 
descriptive, not prescriptive.  
Not too surprisingly—considering the base rate problem mentioned 
before—there has been no prospective validation of these instruments 
and hence no predictive validity test confirmation.130 This void 
significantly undermines claims regarding empirical quality. Indeed, all 
three have been criticized for lacking transparency in their datasets and 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Mark. A Ruiz et al., Co-Occurring Mental Health and Substance Use Problems in 
Offenders, 24 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 77, 84 (2011). This method is also known as ex-post 
forecasting. Jacek A. Kopec et al., Validation of Population-Based Disease Simulation Models, 
10 BMC PUB. HEALTH 5 (Nov. 18, 2010), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/ 
track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-10-710 [https://perma.cc/U2XH-KC6X]. 
 125. Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 237. 
 126. Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 40. 
 127. Id. at 48, 50; Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12; D. Elaine Pressman, The Complex 
Dynamic Causality of Violent Extremism: Applications of the VERA-2 Risk Assessment Method 
to CVE Initiatives, in DISASTER FORENSICS: UNDERSTANDING ROOT CAUSE AND COMPLEX 
CAUSALITY 249, 251 (Anthony J. Masys ed., 2016).     
 128. Pressman, supra note 127; Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 48, 50; Meloy & Genzman, 
supra note 12. 
 129. Monahan, supra note 87, at 172. 
 130. Allard R. Feddes, Risk Assessment in Integral Security Policy, in DE-RADICALISATION: 
SCIENTIFIC INSIGHTS FOR POLICY 47, 55 (Lore Colaert ed., 2017). A predictive validation should 
include an external validation of the instrument on a different dataset. Kopec et al., supra note 
124, at 8.  
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methods and for failing to discuss many commonly reported 
methodological quality markers, such as predictive validity, 
representativeness of sample, and internal consistency.131  
Further limitations prevent current tests from reliably predicting 
terrorism risks. Each of the tools is plagued by redundancy across 
factors.132 More unfortunately, all three contain various predictor factors 
that overlap with the dependent variable of terrorism.133 For example, 
each includes items regarding ideological motivation.134 Yet ideology is 
a critical component that differentiates terrorism from ordinary violence 
in the first place.135 For assessment purposes, the problem is that some 
type of ideological driver is by definition present in terroristic acts, thus 
rendering it tautological. Further, testing for ideological motivation 
among terrorists cannot separate the test subjects into high and low-risk 
groups, which is a fundamental requirement of risk assessment.136 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Akimi Scarcella et al., Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism, Authoritarianism and 
Fundamentalism: A Systematic Review of the Quality and Psychometric Properties of 
Assessments, 11 PLOS ONE 15 (Dec. 21, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/ 
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0166947&type=printable [https://perma.cc/E8X8-XT9Q]. 
 132. See Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 46 fig.2 (listing factors of ERG 22+ test that, upon 
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empathy . . . outside own group,” “expressed intent to act violently” and “[e]xpressed intent 
to . . . prepare violent action”). 
 133. See Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 46 fig.2 (containing several factors necessarily 
present in terrorism: “[p]olitical/moral motivation,” “[n]eed to redress injustice and express 
grievance,” “[o]ver-identification with a . . . cause,” “[h]armful end objectives,” “[a]ttitudes that 
justify offending”); Meloy & Genzman, supra note 127, at 143–44 (2015) (e.g., “[p]redatory 
violence,” “[f]ramed by an ideology”); Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 245 tbl.1 (e.g., 
“[c]ommitment to ideology justifying violence,” “[d]riven by moral imperative,” “[i]dentification 
of target . . . in response to perceived injustice”). 
 134. See Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 46 fig.2 (e.g., “[p]olitical/moral motivation”); Meloy 
& Genzman, supra note 127, at 143–44 (2015) (e.g., “[f]ramed by an ideology”); Pressman & 
Flockton, supra note 11, at 245 tbl.1 (e.g., “[c]ommitment to ideology justifying violence”). 
 135. See Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 241 (describing terrorism as “[i]deological 
violence . . . motivated by commitment to a cause or belief system,” as opposed to “common 
violence such as rape, murder, robbery and assault”). 
 136. Borum, supra note 90, at 65. To be an acceptable predictor, the factor must show some 
amount of variation in order to “correctly identify an acceptable proportion of those who go on to 
offend (sensitivity) and those who do not go on to offend[] (specificity).” Kiran M. Sarma, Risk 
Assessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism, 72 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 278, 281 (2017). 
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VERA-2 and ERG 22+ were designed to assist correctional officials 
in making decisions about “sentencing, rehabilitation, and reintegration 
of [terrorist] offenders.”137 Both tests strongly emphasize group-based 
Islamist terrorists.138 The generalizability to other types of terrorist 
ideologies and to any lone actors is thus dubious at best.139 It is curious 
that VERA-2 and ERG 22+ are expressly designed for correctional use 
on known terrorists140 as the instruments rely upon factors that 
theoretically relate to first-time offending. The developers fortunately do 
not purport that their guidelines are relevant to recidivist terrorism.141 
This situation further limits the use of these tools as acceptable risk 
measures. Previously identified terrorists notably appear to have 
relatively small recidivism rates, precluding any presumption that past 
terrorist acts are strongly predictive of future terrorist attacks.142 Based 
on the evidence of convicted or suspected terrorists released from 
custody, Andrew Silke estimates that less than five percent will commit 
another violent or nonviolent terroristic act.143 
As for the third tool, the TRAP-18 is designed for lone actors, though 
it included small cells in the developmental samples and merely measures 
the presence of listed behaviors in known terrorists. Therefore, this tool 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Sarma, supra note 136, at 280. 
 138. Stephen D. Hart et al., A Concurrent Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the 
Individual Assessment of Terrorism 9, 15 (TSAS Working Paper No. 17-1, 2017), 
http://www.tsas.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2017-01-Hart-WP-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YL6P-XDZE]. 
 139. Monahan, supra note 87, at 181–82. 
 140. See Hart et al., supra note 138, at 10, 15. 
 141. E.g., Pressman, supra note 128, at 259 (“The outcome of assessments for radicalization 
to violence is not prediction of recidivism . . . .”). 
 142. Andrew Silke, Risk Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Prisoners, in PRISONS, 
TERRORISM, AND EXTREMISM: CRITICAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT, RADICALISATION AND REFORM 
108, 111 (Andrew Silke ed., 2014). 
 143. See id. Of 453 terrorist prisoners released in Northern Ireland in 1998, over two percent 
were recalled after being accused of further involvement in terrorism. Id. at 112. Terrorist reentry 
programs in Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Sweden reported terrorism recidivism rates of less than 
two, five, and six percent, respectively. Kristen Bell, Looking Outward: Enhancing Australia’s 
Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programs, 11 SECURITY CHALLENGES 1, 10 n.64, 11–12 
(2015). A German document reports a recidivism rate of approximately three percent for over 500 
persons who successfully completed a deradicalization program. EXIT-Germany: We Provide 
Ways Out of Extremism, EXIT-DEUTSCHLAND, http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9LNB-EX5A]. At least one report found a higher 
recidivism rate, though it is not based on convicted terrorists. U.S. officials report that as of July 
2015, over seventeen percent of detainees released from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were confirmed 
to have reengaged in terrorist activity. DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE 
REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 1 (2017), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GTMO%20Sept_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRY6-XY85]. 
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is retroactively descriptive rather than predictive.144 The developer 
admits that it could best be described as a work in progress.145  
In sum, these three instruments are best conceived as developmental 
exercises which make some contributions to scientific knowledge about 
already identified terrorists. The next Part, though, sketches a conceptual 
framework for a threat assessment approach as a more proper alternative 
to risk assessment with respect to individual terrorists. 
III.  EVIDENCE-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR LONE-ACTOR 
TERRORISTS 
The previously enumerated issues explaining why common actuarial-
based methods for developing risk assessment tools are unsupportable do 
not dictate that assessing individuals for the potential of committing 
terrorism can never constitute an evidence-based practice. Rather, the 
framework itself, along with certain methodologies, must be re-specified, 
considering the unique challenges presented by terrorists and terrorism. 
The initial recasting in this new framework is replacing the concept of 
risk assessment with threat assessment. Overall, the threat assessment 
framework for terrorism (a) requires a far more holistic attempt at 
gathering a wider variety of data than any single instrument could list, (b) 
must draw on, as well as feed, national security intelligence, (c) requires 
more intense analytical skill, nuance, and imagination, (d) should 
comprise a multidisciplinary team effort charged with detecting and 
preventing terrorism, and (e) should draw upon theoretical and empirical 
insights from relevant academic fields. A visual rendering of the 
framework that will be fleshed out next is provided in Figure 1. 
A.  Threat versus Risk  
Threat assessment concerning terroristic violence diverges 
substantively from traditional risk assessment practices for ordinary 
criminal violence for important reasons.146 To begin, risk assessment is 
inherently quantitative in its expected conclusion concerning an 
individual’s probability of reoffending.147 In the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s lexicon, for example, risk is defined as the 
likelihood of an unwanted outcome, such that risk assessment “assigns 
values to risks.”148 The agency views a threat as anything that “indicates 
                                                                                                                     
 144. See Meloy & Genzman, supra note 127, at 140–41. 
 145. Id. at 149. 
 146. See Randy Borum, Operationally Relevant Research and Practice in Terrorism Threat 
Assessments, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 192, 192 (2015). 
 147. Id. at 192–93. 
 148. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS RISK LEXICON: 2010 EDITION 27–28 (2010). 
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the potential to harm.”149 Threat assessment is thereby distinct in not 
relying upon quantitative values or metrics of prediction. Indeed, with the 
low base rate of terroristic attacks, it fundamentally cannot do so.150  
There is likewise a differentiation between probabilistic versus 
possibilistic thinking. As a general rule, actuarial-based risk assessment 
fixates on estimating the statistical probability of an individual engaging 
in the outcome of interest.151 Risk assessment, even from a clinical 
judgment perspective, is fundamentally about the likelihood of 
violence.152 Again, because of the low base rate for terrorism, 
probabilistic 
  
                                                                                                                     
 149. Id. at 36. 
 150. Benjamin A. Perman et al., Basic Principles of Threat Assessment, in BIOSECURITY: 
UNDERSTANDING, ASSESSING, AND PREVENTING THE THREAT 89, 91 (Ryan Burnette ed., 2013). 
 151. See Borum, supra note 146, at 192–93; Seth J. Prins & Adam Reich, Can We Avoid 
Reductionism in Risk Reduction?, 22 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 258, 261–62 (2017), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1362480617707948 [https://perma.cc/67SM-
QFDY].  
 152. Kevin S. Douglas et al., Violence Risk Assessment: Science and Practice, 4 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 149, 153–54 (1999). 
1342 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
  
2018] A THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR LONE-ACTOR TERRORISTS 1343 
 
reasoning concerning individual offenders has little to offer terrorism 
analysis.153 The reality of this can be illustrated in other ways. 
People often make two types of errors when thinking about 
probabilities.154 One error is failing to understand that the probability of 
an outcome is base rate dependent.155 The accuracy of predicting the 
probability of an event that is a common occurrence in the population of 
interest will likely be significant. On the other hand, tests that are 
otherwise highly accurate cannot predict low base rate outcomes at even 
minimally sufficient levels.156 Indeed, the inaccuracy of predictive tools 
only increases as the base rate of an event falls below fifty percent.157 The 
extreme low base rate of terroristic violence thus renders mathematical, 
probabilistic assertions required in risk assessment practices untenable.  
The second common error is confounding a conditional probability 
with its inverse. This error would equate the probability (p) of A given B 
with the probability of B given A as represented in the equation: p (A / B) 
= p (B / A).158 As a quick illustration, a finding that most of those who 
carried out terrorist attacks in a particular region were Muslim does not 
mean that most Muslims in that area will, in the future, commit terrorist 
acts. These are not reciprocal probabilities. This raises another caution 
about the first structured tools for predicting terroristic actions, including 
VERA-2, ERG 22+, and TRAP-18. The existence of descriptive, not 
prognostic, factors may confuse assessors into erroneously assuming 
those factors are predictive. 
In any event, threat assessment is more about possibilistic thinking.159 
An evaluator thereby considers the potentiality of a terroristic attack.160 
This is consistent with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
formal lexicon defining threat assessment as a “product or process of 
identifying or evaluating entities, actions, or occurrences, whether natural 
or man-made, that have or indicate the potential to harm life, information, 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See Jytte Klausen et al., The Terrorist Age-Crime Curve: An Analysis of American 
Islamist Terrorist Offenders and Age-Specific Propensity for Participation in Violent and 
Nonviolent Incidents, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 19, 20 (2016). 
 154. These are corollaries of Bayes Theorem. Richard W. Elwood, Calculating Probability 
in Sex Offender Risk Assessment, INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1262, 1266 
(2016). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 59, at 184. 
 158. Elwood, supra note 154. 
 159. Frank Furedi, Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk Assessment, 2 
ERASMUS L. REV. 197, 206 (2009); Gabe Mythen & Sandra Walklate, Counterterrorism and the 
Reconstruction of (In)Security: Divisions, Dualisms, Duplicities, 56 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1107, 
1112 (2016). 
 160. Marieke de Goede & Beatrice de Graaf, Sentencing Risk: Temporality and Precaution 
in Terrorism Trials, 7 INT’L POL. SOC. 313, 317 (2013). 
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operations, and/or property.”161 Notice that this definition contains no 
probabilistic language like that included in the department’s formulation 
of risk assessment. 
B.  Prediction versus Prevention 
The inability to assess statistical probabilities also means that threat 
assessment is not reliant upon numerically predictive terms.162 Security 
agencies have generally grown to accept this quandary.163 As Britain’s 
National Security Council avers, the focus is instead on preventing and 
mitigating terrorist threats.164 Indeed, the roots of threat assessment 
derive from the United States Secret Service of twenty years ago, with 
respect to managing persons who targeted high profile victims, such as 
politicians.165 The agency then described threat assessment in terms of its 
goal of identifying, assessing, and managing potential perpetrators of 
targeted violence.166 A recent FBI statement on prevention of targeted 
attacks is consistent therewith: 
A threat assessment is not a final product, but the beginning 
of the management process. It guides a course of action to 
mitigate a threat of potential violence; merely identifying 
that someone is of moderate or higher concern, without 
developing a management strategy, does not complete this 
process and is not recommended.167 
Threat assessment is assuredly not as reactive as prevention might 
suggest if the context were typical domestic policing in terms of 
intervening during the commission of a crime. Threat assessment for 
counterterrorism constitutes a more proactive mission of front-end threat 
management—ideally long before an individual begins to execute a 
terroristic attack.168 Because of the extraordinary impact of terrorist 
attacks, threat assessment operates in another dimension in the form of 
                                                                                                                     
 161. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 37. 
 162. See Borum, supra note 146, at 192–93. 
 163. See Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, 2488 
U.N.T.S. 129, 134 (showing that European countries are working together to exchange 
information to prevent terrorism). 
 164. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NATIONAL 
STRATEGY 11 (2010). 
 165. Brian Vossekuil et al., Threat Assessment: Assessing the Risk of Targeted Violence, 2 
J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 243, 243–44 (2015). 
 166. Fein et al., supra note 86. 
 167. AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 4. 
 168. Meloy, supra note 83, at 233. 
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“premeditation,” meaning the attempt to mediate an act before it 
occurs.169 
C.  Triplet of Threat Assessment 
Threat assessment is a far more robust exercise than risk assessment 
for ordinary criminal violence. Threat assessment is not restricted to 
simply evaluating whether an individual will attempt to carry out an 
attack in a binary manner. Threat assessment aspires to broader ambitions 
in determining the nature, imminence, contextual prerequisites, 
situational characteristics, and frequency of potential terrorist 
outcomes.170  
Thus, the Department of Homeland Security refers to threat 
assessment for terroristic attacks as involving the triplet of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences, with overlapping interests.171 The 
relevant diagram is visually represented in Figure 2.172  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Thomas Martin, Governing an Unknowable Future: The Politics of Britain’s Prevent 
Policy, 7 CRITICAL STUD. TERRORISM 62, 65 (2014). 
 170. Borum, supra note 146, at 193. 
 171. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 32 (defining a risk core 
as a “numerical representation that gauges the combination of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence at a specific moment”). 
 172. Terje Aven & Seth Guikema, On the Concept and Definition of Terrorism Risk, 35 RISK 
ANALYSIS 2162, 2162 (2015). 
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Each of the three domains encompasses multiple dimensions. The 
model could well form the basis of a forensic analysis as part of the 
overall framework. 
The threat segment concerns the intention, that is, goals and motives, 
and capabilities of the potential terrorist.173 Terrorists are predatory in 
nature, such that their conscious actions preceding a potential attack 
provide important data.174 An individual’s intent, for instance, can yield 
useful information for prevention purposes regarding the likely choice of 
a future target.175 Rather than considering static traits commonly used in 
risk assessment models, a threat assessment focuses on analyzing 
personal facts.176 Facts here refers to the “individual’s patterns of 
thinking and behavior” which indicate whether the person is becoming 
radicalized, or if already radicalized, is moving toward carrying out an 
attack.177  
Recall that one of the differentiating features of terrorism is the 
prerequisite of having the capability to carry out a high-consequence 
attack.178 An evaluator thus gauges capacity by the extent to which the 
individual has attained the requisite knowledge, skills, means, 
instrumentalities, and access to an intended target to launch a terrorist 
offensive.179 Experts observe that capability also typically requires an 
exceptional amount of human energy to prepare and mount a herculean 
task and to put oneself in such peril.180 Researchers have suggested 
certain behaviors for an assessor to look for in judging whether the 
individual’s energy level has risen to the task.181  
The interaction between intent and capability is critical. An adversary 
is one with the terroristic intent but without the capability to carry out an 
attack, whereas a threat has both, which raises the stakes and urgency of 
counterterrorist management and prevention.182  
                                                                                                                     
 173. Melissa R. Haynes & Matthew J. Giblin, Homeland Security Risk and Preparedness in 
Police Agencies: The Insignificance of Actual Risk Factors, 17 POLICE Q. 30, 37 (2014). 
 174. Perman et al., supra note 150, at 89.  
 175. Aven & Guikema, supra note 172, at 2164. 
 176. Vossekuil et al., supra note 165, at 249. 
 177. AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 4.  
 178. Lindekilde et al., supra note 101, at 8. 
 179. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 9.  
 180. Kruglanski et al., supra note 98, at 224. 
 181. See AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 34 (noting that energy burst warning behavior is 
manifested through “an increased pace, duration, or range of any noted activities related to a 
potential target”). 
 182. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 7. 
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The vulnerability segment is often considered on a macro level for 
counterterrorism purposes.183 For instance, vulnerability considers 
redundancy within infrastructures and the resilience of targeted 
institutions.184 Still, vulnerability carries additional constructs that are 
more relevant to the threat assessment of individuals. These include 
factors, such as “us-versus-them” thinking style and the dehumanization 
of others, that may increase the person’s susceptibility to ideological 
influences and to adopting cognitive and emotional states that make 
others acceptable targets of attack.185  
Vulnerability also addresses the personal, social, and environmental 
situations which may render push and pull factors toward extremism 
more enticing to the individual.186 Threat assessment is thereby highly 
engaged with the relevance of social, situational, and environmental 
characteristics that foster and enable extremism.187 Hence, better threat 
assessment methods also consider those protective factors that are threat 
reducing.188 Further, vulnerability considers the likelihood of success of 
the person’s potential attack.189  
To briefly address the third domain, consequences refers to the 
possible ramifications of an attack with respect to loss of human life, 
economic losses,190 psychological damages,191 physical vulnerability of 
structures,192 and the target’s ability to perform a function or meet its 
objectives after sustaining an attack.193  
The attributes of capability and vulnerability mean that threat 
assessment must be operational in terms of gathering information in real 
time to mitigate an attack and must be urgently accomplished if the 
individual’s attack appears imminent.194 At the same time, threat 
assessment is dynamic and contextual in having to keep up and/or 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 38 (defining vulnerability in terms of “an entity, asset, system, network, or 
geographic area”).  
 184. Id. at 26. An example of redundancy would be the existence of “additional or alternative 
systems, sub-systems, assets, or processes that maintain a degree of overall functionality in case 
of loss or failure of another system, sub-system, asset, or processes,” while resilience may regard 
the “ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from 
disruption.” Id.  
 185. Sarma, supra note 136, at 280. 
 186. Borum, supra note 90, at 76, 77. 
 187. Vossekuil et al., supra note 165, at 249. 
 188. See AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 29 (explaining that both threat-enhancing and 
threat-mitigating factors are identified by experts). 
 189. Haynes & Giblin, supra note 173, at 33. 
 190. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS RISK LEXICON: 2008 EDITION, 14 chart III (2008). 
 191. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 25. 
 192. Haynes & Giblin, supra note 173, at 34. 
 193. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 21. 
 194. Meloy, supra note 83, at 233. 
 
1348 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
reassess as the individual, the situation, and the environmental contexts 
evolve and shift.195 Indeed, counterterrorism experts acknowledge that 
their laborious efforts may end up for naught.196 Because of the evolving 
nature of terrorists as they engage in predatory maneuvering, “it means 
that the actual [threat assessment] results may be useless because 
terrorism is an ever-changing phenomenon that, by the time we have 
analyzed it in one way, has morphed into something else . . . .”197 
Notwithstanding these sentiments, an SPJ-light model can have a 
significant role in the broader threat assessment scheme that is being 
suggested here. As addressed earlier, the model cannot include an 
actuarially-based component. Yet, it can have some structure. For 
example, a suggested foundation that captures at least some of the essence 
of the threat and vulnerability segments of the triplet of threat assessment 
theorizes a four-stage analysis of relevant static and dynamic factors: (1) 
behavioral history analysis, (2) motivational analysis, (3) vulnerability to 
persuasion analysis, and (4) a formulation analysis that hypothesizes 
about the relationships between the observations noted in the prior 
three.198 The hypotheses in part (4) would best attempt to explain a 
potential causal link to terrorist attacks for the individual, in other words, 
forming an historical narrative about why the perceived risk factors are 
relevant to the threat the individual is judged to pose.199 
Some authorities conceptualize threat assessment as a subspecialty of 
risk assessment.200 The contention here, however, is that it is preferable 
to conceptualize threat assessment as its own genre to avoid confusing 
the two. Indeed, the framework for threat assessment for individual 
terrorists offered to this point has attempted to substantively distinguish 
itself from contemporary risk assessment practices for ordinary criminal 
violence. Besides, the next significant addition moves the threat 
assessment schema into another knowledge dimension entirely—one 
which is clearly particularized to counterterrorism. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 195. Malone, supra note 120, at 54. 
 196. Robert Danisch, Risk Assessment as Rhetorical Practice: The Ironic Mathematics 
behind Terrorism, Banking, and Public Policy, 22 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 236, 241 (2011). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Borum, supra note 90, at 76–78. 
 199. Sarma, supra note 136, at 284. These factors are premises in which inductive reasoning 
is used: if the premises are true there is strong evidence that the conclusion is true. It is noted that 
the TRAP-18 tool might in some future form be useful in the first of such a four step process 
regarding a behavioural analysis regarding lone-actor terrorists. Though at this point without 
further evidence of predictive validity—or at least some proxy for it—some caution in relying 
upon it is recommended. Borum, supra note 146, at 194. 
 200. Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12, at 233 (conceptualizing threat assessment as a 
“young tributary from an older and wider river we refer to as violence risk assessment”). 
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D.  National Security Intelligence 
Any forensic assessment model for the potential of terrorist attacks 
must merge with security agencies’ intelligence expertise.201 In this way, 
knowledge-informed decisions should not rely only upon the professional 
judgement (structured or not) of individual assessors in terrorism 
assessment cases, no matter how experienced and skilled they may be. 
This is because national security intelligence presents its own skillset and 
often requires the input of multiple professionals.202 According to the 
United States Federal Bureau of Intelligence, national security 
intelligence requires “the application of individual and collective 
cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a 
sociocultural context.”203 Further, intelligence analysts have access to 
information and data that the forensic assessor will not, usually due to 
national security concerns.204 
One of the exceptional challenges in preventing terrorism pertains to 
the “conundrum of knowing/not knowing” the future.205 This means that 
officials try to prevent terrorism before it happens despite being uncertain 
about whether the individual actually will commit a criminal act in the 
future.206 In a similar vein, national security analysts in the United 
Kingdom note that policymakers understand that the job is to take 
precautions against future risks that are unknown, imprecise, and 
ultimately incalculable.207 The following sentiment sums up the situation 
                                                                                                                     
 201. See generally Malone, supra note 120 (discussing the application of the intelligence 
cycle model to threat assessment). 
 202. Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
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BJPSYCH BULL. 82, 82 (2016) (“The immediacy of terrorist threats, often unexpected and in spite 
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nicely: “by far the most awesome and fearsome dangers are precisely 
those that are impossible, or excruciatingly difficult, to anticipate: the 
unpredicted, and in all likelihood unpredictable ones.”208  
These challenges again demarcate risk assessment as a far more 
knowledge-based exercise, even if that knowledge is incomplete. The risk 
assessment structure thus does not apply to future events like terrorist 
attacks, which are uncertain and whose quantitative probabilities are 
unknown and unknowable.209 This is even truer for the subset of lone-
actor terrorists, considering their new embodiment of idiosyncratic 
trajectories and inventive forms of attacks.210 On the other hand, perhaps 
there is a window toward intelligence-based investigation for detecting 
lone actors due to their greater tendency toward using social media, which 
provides some avenues to detection.211 
Nevertheless, any structural form that forensic examiners may engage 
will have its limits. Uncertainty means that national security intelligence 
requires the input of distinctly human intellect and creativity.212 More 
particularly, the exercise in the futurization of terror213 needs an 
imagination to be able to identify possible extremists, their 
vulnerabilities, emerging instrumentalities, and inventive modes of 
attack.214 In sum, counterterrorism intelligence comprises an imaginary 
exercise to tame a hypothetical future.215 Far beyond prediction, this 
means engaging “cultural fantasies of how risk scenarios may play out, 
and the concomitant mobilizations of collective anxieties and political 
possibilities in the present.”216 Evaluators here may need to transcend 
their own cultural values and norms to be able to conceptualize the 
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individual terrorist’s mindset and specific worldview.217 At the very least, 
this would entail theoretically accepting the individual’s grievance and 
non-normative belief system in order to hypothesize connections to 
extremist acts. 
Developing national security intelligence is a complicated and 
intensive process.218 Unlike the more common risk assessment projects 
regarding actuarial and clinical judgements rendered at discrete points in 
time, the terrorism threat assessment model envisions an evolving 
intelligence cycle, with a continuous feedback loop, and potentially 
repeated reassessments.219 All of this means that threat assessment must 
draw on cross-disciplinary and professional genres—that is, a 
multidisciplinary threat assessment team.220 The team could well include 
forensic case examiners, behavioral scientists, intelligence analysts, law 
enforcement agents, and, in the context of detained or convicted 
terrorists, correctional professionals.221 
Despite the value of the imaginary exercises into the unknowable 
future, the “knowledge” gained from them and from anecdotal data must 
still be tested as it may well be unfounded when subjected to scientific 
scrutiny.222 
E.  Academic Research 
There is a final piece to the overall threat assessment framework 
developed herein. The role of empirical research has been mentioned 
already. But greater emphasis on it requires highlighting and developing 
the subject matter even more, considering quality research on individual 
terrorists has generally been lacking to date.223 
Multidisciplinary threat assessment teams could greatly benefit from 
more and stronger input from cross-disciplinary academic study. This 
observation is particularly salient in that security experts cite the need for 
more vigorous research specifically targeted at lone-actor terrorists.224 An 
important reason that lone-actor terrorism research is so far behind is that 
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sufficient data may not be available for security reasons.225 However, this 
may be remedied if counterterrorism forces and academics liaise more 
frequently. Security officials have the data; academics have the 
methodologies and theoretical approaches.226 An exchange may be in 
order. At the same time, too little of intelligence analysis has been 
scientifically scrutinized to date.227 
Overall, best practices for threat assessment are evidence-based in 
terms of drawing on data, knowledge, and theoretical insights from 
empirical research. A recent Federal Bureau of Investigation report 
affirmatively refers to the value of incorporating published research 
alongside practitioner experience into intelligence investigations.228  
Two areas of research will be highlighted here. The first regards 
empirical study on individuals for terrorism potential. The second 
addresses theoretical offerings to inform broader perspectives in 
attempting to conceive how lone-actor terrorists will emerge in the future 
considering more macro-level, cultural climates. 
1.  Research on Lone Actors 
Research methods on terrorism must be suited to its nature and its 
limits. The basis for risk assessment tools for ordinary criminal violence 
is properly a nomothetic, population-based approach for research and 
analysis.229 As ordinary criminal violence is common, large datasets are 
available to mine for correlative factors. This comprises a “many 
individuals-many cases” form of analysis.230 In contrast, the extremely 
low base rate of terroristic violence and the paucity of known terrorists 
available to study means that statistical analyses for terroristic violence 
generally cannot follow the same model. The evidence-based model for 
threat assessment simply leads to another respecification of the 
methodological option. 
Empirical studies for terroristic violence can appropriately use an 
idiographic, case study approach.231 The case study approach is 
eminently appropriate for idiosyncratic lone-actor terrorists as singular 
cases.232 Any single case study may provide some insight into at least one 
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trajectory toward extremism. Without group-based influences necessarily 
explaining the radicalization or extremist action pathways for lone actors, 
case study research may help contextualize what starts individuals down 
those pathways.233 Case studies can also help delineate the various 
personality and/or environmental drivers that may be unique to lone 
actors.234 
The study of human actors who are planning, thinking, and modifying 
their behavior based on an intended target’s responses is well suited to a 
case study research approach, as the pathway to an attack is not likely to 
be a linear one.235 Rather, it may become a cat-and-mouse game between 
the threat and his target. Still, while the individual case may have value, 
it also has its limits in terms of generalizability. Notably, a 
methodological procedure exists in which case studies can be a 
disciplined and ordered research regime, the results of which may be 
useful beyond the single case.236 This form of study entails the “single 
individual-many cases” approach.237 
Scholars have sketched out a systematic approach to the case study 
method as follows:  
[A structured focused comparison model] allows the 
researcher to apply structure and focus to the evaluation of 
explanatory factors [and] . . . establish validity by conducting 
theoretical uniformed inquiries of each explanatory factor. 
Simply put, this method is “structured,” in that it allows the 
researcher to create general questions that emphasize and 
reflect upon a research objective. These questions are asked 
of each selected case thus, creating a “systematic 
comparison.” Second, the method is focused, in that it only 
evaluates certain features within the historical cases. The 
benefit of using this method is that it standardizes the 
research.238  
In short, researchers using this systematic case study approach can 
make inferences from patterns observed both within and across cases.239 
The systematic case study approach offers the advantage of honing 
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behavioral science theories about the mindsets of lone-actors.240 The 
method is suitable as well for creating theoretical typologies of types of 
causal patterns across cases.241 Such an approach may actually be better 
suited to accounting for equifinality and complex interaction effects.242 
Both are hypothesized as relevant where various terrorist radicalization 
pathways exist and experts note the tendency for clustering effects, such 
as when certain terrorist behaviors often co-occur.243  
Another methodological change that the empirical study of lone-
actors can beneficially make concerns the unit of analysis. Most research 
on terrorism has tended to focus on the group or event levels.244 For the 
study of lone-actor terrorists, the more suitable unit of analysis seems to 
be the individual terrorist.  
In sum, it is important to improve upon knowledge and insight into 
individual terrorists, their mindsets, and their trajectories into extremist 
violence. Yet this information must be conveyed throughout the 
multidisciplinary threat assessment team.245 There are signs that this may 
not be happening. For example, a recent study found that intelligence 
analysts in England tended not to rely on evidence-based knowledge; 
instead the analysts appeared to be drawing on pop-psychology to 
conceptualize lone-actor terrorists, their mindsets, and their strategic 
choices.246 
2.  Research to Inform Dynamically Changing Climates 
The second area in this research agenda responds to a call for 
empirical research at more macro-levels. Critics have decried “the 
fetishization of parts” occurring in much of terrorism research, meaning 
the “tendency to study terrorism separately from the social movements, 
state structures, conflicts, history, contexts, and international 
relationships within which it occurs.”247 Hence, potential philosophical 
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groundworks could include social movement, social ecology, personality, 
social disorganization, and social cognitive theories.248  
Similarly, in the future-oriented logic of risk prevention there exists a 
significant gap between largely static-oriented academic research and the 
more dynamic needs of counterterrorism officials making decisions in 
real time and on the ground.249 Thus, counterterrorism officials seek 
theoretical foundations for insights into cultural and environmental 
changes that may promote new forms of terrorists and modes of attack.250 
Consistent with such a call, the European Commission recently 
announced funding for research on emerging trends in drivers to 
radicalization, and specifically on the motivations posed by the new lone 
actor threats.251 
In other words, instead of terrorism studies being mostly 
retrospectively oriented on historically limited events, researchers could 
better aim to assist counterterrorist agencies and the threat assessment 
process by offering evidence-based insights into newer pathways to 
extremism and terrorist acts. As an example, some researchers are more 
timely in exploring how the increase in far-right populism in the United 
States and England in the last few years has created an environment of 
nationalism, welfare chauvinism, and xenophobia in which right-wing, 
lone-actor terrorists are surfacing.252 
CONCLUSIONS 
Unlike risk assessment of ordinary criminals, analyses of the potential 
that individuals will carry out lone-actor terrorist attacks cannot rely upon 
big data to feed its information needs. Nonetheless, there is hope that the 
threat assessment of lone actors may still have a basis in scientific 
research. This Article sets forth an evidence-based framework for the 
threat assessment of lone actor terrorists. On the micro-level, it 
conceptualizes a multidisciplinary threat assessment team using 
structured professional judgment to analyze the individual’s intent, 
capability, and vulnerability to extremism, while also considering the 
potential consequences of an attack. More and greater efforts on the part 
                                                                                                                     
 248. Sarma, supra note 136, at 285. 
 249. Blanco & Cohen, supra note 13, at 27; see also Lindekilde et al., supra note 101 
(suggesting research beyond the micro-level to uncover “mechanisms that can link individual 
actor characteristics to specific settings and configurations of social relations in fostering the 
propensity to consider terrorism as a viable action alternative”). 
 250. Edwin Bakker, Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach, 5 J. 
STRATEGIC SECURITY 69, 77–78 (2012). 
 251. Preventing Radicalisation, supra note 32. 
 252. See generally THOMAS GREVEN, RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIAN 
NATIONALISM IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE (2017) (explaining how right-wing populists and 
authoritarian nationalists have capitalized on the failure to socially regulate economic 
globalization and cultural change); Feldman, supra note 34, at 272, 281. 
1356 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
of empirical researchers to study lone actors may, in the future, form the 
basis of structured judgment tools.  
Intelligence experts must also engage in an imaginary exercise of 
foreseeing the future—considering lone actors are highly 
unpredictable—in a relative vacuum of solid knowledge of all relevant 
facts and circumstances. The framework considers macro-level 
theoretical research informing counterterrorism forces of the cultural, 
environmental, and situational drivers that may spawn new forms of 
terrorists and modes of attack. The evidence-based practice set forth 
conceives of the need for intelligence communities and empirical 
researchers to substantially improve their cooperation. Academics need 
relevant data that intelligence agencies harbor, and agencies seek 
theoretical and knowledge-based insights from researchers. Urgency in 
addressing these considerations is clear as even newer forms of lone-actor 
attacks are likely on the horizon. 
 
